CVE-2026-15894

/// Technical description

The Bluetooth Mesh On-Demand Private Proxy solicitation handler in subsys/bluetooth/mesh/solicitation.c copies a received Solicitation PDU into a fixed 17-byte stack buffer without bounding the source length. In sol_pdu_decrypt(), out is allocated as NET_BUF_SIMPLE(17) and then filled with net_buf_simple_add_mem(out, in->data, in->len); net_buf_simple_add() guards its tailroom only with __ASSERT_NO_MSG, which is compiled out in production builds, so when in->len > 17 the underlying memcpy writes attacker-controlled bytes past the 17-byte stack buffer. The copy occurs before any decryption or authentication, so no key material is required to trigger it.

The oversized length arises because the mesh scan callback in subsys/bluetooth/mesh/adv.c calls net_buf_simple_restore() before dispatching to bt_mesh_sol_recv(), leaving buf->len covering the entire remaining advertising payload rather than just the Solicitation Service Data. After the parser locates the Service Data AD and consumes th

/// Remediation

Check the references section for vendor advisories, patches, and mitigation guidance. If immediate patching is not possible, review the CVSS vector to understand the attack surface and apply compensating controls such as network segmentation or access restrictions.

/// References