CVE-2026-19184

/// Technical description

The NXP GAU ADC driver (drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c) validated the caller-supplied sequence->buffer_size, which is expressed in bytes, against the number of active channels, which is a sample count. It then stored that byte count directly in data->results_length and used it in mcux_gau_adc_read_samples() as the number of uint16_t slots available. Because each conversion result occupies sizeof(uint16_t) bytes, a buffer that was accepted as "large enough" could be written with up to twice its size in bytes, so every sample past the buffer's midpoint was written out of bounds.

adc_read() and adc_read_async() are Zephyr system calls. The syscall verifier in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c only confirms that the caller owns buffer_size writable bytes (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE); deciding whether that size is sufficient for the requested channels and extra_samplings is delegated entirely to the driver. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a user-mode thread that has been granted the ADC device ob

/// Remediation

Check the references section for vendor advisories, patches, and mitigation guidance. If immediate patching is not possible, review the CVSS vector to understand the attack surface and apply compensating controls such as network segmentation or access restrictions.

/// References