CVE-2026-91012

/// Technical description

org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties),

which backs the "config" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file

it writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that

the result stays inside ${karaf.etc}:

* if the submitted property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry, that value is turned directly into a File (getCfgFileFromProperty), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to;

* otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + ".cfg")), so a PID containing ".." segments resolves outside ${karaf.etc}. createFactoryConfiguration() has the same issue via the factory PID/alias.

Both code paths are reachable by any caller holding the "manager" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg: "update = manager"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-c

/// Remediation

Check the references section for vendor advisories and patches from apache. Update karaf to the latest patched version. If immediate patching is not possible, review the CVSS vector to understand the attack surface and apply compensating controls such as network segmentation or access restrictions.

/// Affected products

/// References